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Military Commissions and Courts-Martial: A Brief Discussion of the Constitutional and
Jurisdictional Distinctions Between the Two Courts
Major Timothy C. MacDonnell
Professor Criminal Law Department
The Judge Advocate General s School, United States Army
Charlottesville, Virginia
On 13 November 2001, President George W. Bush signed
Military Order 222, authorizing the trial of non-U.S. citizens
for war crimes by military commission.' Since the signing of
that order, a contentious debate has raged over the possible use
of military commissions to try suspected terrorists. As part of
that debate, the media has used various terms to describe the
proposed military commissions. They have called them "Secret
Military Trials,"'2 "Military Tribunals,"' and "U.S. Military
Court[s]." 4 A Cable News Network internet story described
military commissions as "essentially a courts-martial, or a mil-
itary trial, during a time of war."5 This quotation illustrates the
underlying misperception that military commissions and
courts-martial are the same.6 They are not.
In fact, substantial differences exist between military com-
missions and courts-martial. Although both courts have existed
since the beginning of the United States, they have existed for
different purposes, based on different sources of constitutional
authority, and with different jurisdictional boundaries. These
differences can affect who may order a trial, who may be tried,
what types of cases the court can hear, and the pretrial, trial, and
appellate procedures applied in a particular case.
This article examines two of the major distinctions between
military commissions and courts-martial: the constitutional
authority to create each court and their respective jurisdictional
limitations. Due to the complicated constitutional and jurisdic-
tional issues presented by military commissions, as compared
to the relatively straightforward courts-martial, this article is
devoted primarily to discussing this generally misunderstood
court.
Section I: Constitutional Authority for Courts-Martial
and Military Commissions
Most illustrative of the distinction between military com-
missions and courts-martial is the constitutional authority for
the creation of these two courts. The Supreme Court has held,
"Congress and the President, like the courts, possess no power
not derived from the Constitution."' Thus, no branch of the
government may convene a court without some source of
authority from the Constitution. This section identifies and
contrasts the constitutional authority for the creation of military
commissions and courts-martial, and discusses the significance
of these differences.
Courts-Martial
The Constitution vests Congress with the authority to create
courts-martial and establish rules for their operation. This
power is derived from Article I, section 8, clause 14 of the Con-
stitution, which states: "The Congress shall have Power ... To
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces."8 Congress first exercised its authority under
Article I, section 8, in 1789, when it expressly recognized the
then existing Articles of War and made them applicable to the
Army.9 In 1950, Congress dramatically revised the Articles of
1. Military Order 222, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
2. Neil King, Jr., Bush Plan to Use Tribunal Will Hurt U.S. in Human-Rights Arena, Some Say, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2001, at A-2.
3. Mona Charen, Presidential Power and Military Tribunals, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2001, at A-17.
4. Dennis Byrne, Can They Get a Fair Trial?; Sweet Justice in a U.S. Military Court, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 2001, at 23.
5. Kevin Drew, Tribunals Break Sharply from Civilian Courts, CNN.com/LAWCENTER (Dec. 7, 2001), at http: //www.cnn.com/2001 /LAW/ 12 /6/inv.tribu-
nals.explainer/index.html.
6. See generally William Glaberson, A Nation Challenged: The Law; Tribunal v. Courts-Martial: Matter of Perception, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001, at B-6 (describing
the misperception and the reaction of former military attorneys to the misperception).
7. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,25 (1942).
8. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8.
9. See WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 23 (2d ed., 1920 reprint).
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War, creating the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)1
Through the UCMJ, Congress established courts; " defined
their jurisdiction; 2 identified crimes;1" delegated authority to
create pre-trial, trial, and post-trial procedures; 4 and created an
appellate system. 5
Military Commissions
Although the constitutional authority for courts-martial is
easy to identify, the power to establish military commissions is
not. Military commissions are a recognized method of trying
those who violate the law of war, 6 but the power to create them
lies at a constitutional crossroad. Both Congress and the Pres-
ident have authority in this area. 7 Congress's authority lies in
Article I, section 8, clauses 1, 10, 11, 14, and 18.1 Particularly
given Congress's authority "to define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high seas, and Offense against the
Law of Nations," 9 there is little question that Congress could,
under appropriate circumstances, establish a military commis-
sion.
Presidential Authority
The more controversial question concerns the President's
authority to establish military commissions based upon his
Article 11 powers. The President's authority regarding commis-
sions is derived from Article II, section 2, clause 1, of the Con-
stitution, which states, "The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States."2 The Pres-
ident's power to appoint a military commission without an
express grant of that authority from Congress is inherent to his
role as the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. This argu-
ment has support from the UCMJ, international law, and
Supreme Court precedent.
Statutory Authority
While the UCMJ discusses military commissions,2 it does
not specifically grant the President the authority to create mili-
tary commissions.22 Instead, Articles 18 and 21, when taken
together, recognize the jurisdiction of military commissions to
try violations of the law of war, and articulate Congress's intent
that the UCMJ not preempt that jurisdiction. Article 18 grants
courts-martial the authority to try anyone suspected of commit-
ting war crimes, including civilians. It states: "[g]eneral
courts-martial... have jurisdiction to try any person who by the
law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal and may
adjudge any punishment permitted by the law of war."2 Article
21 expresses Congress's intent not to interfere with the existing
jurisdiction of military commissions over war crimes:
The provisions of this chapter conferring
jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not
deprive military commissions, provost
courts, or other tribunals of concurrent juris-
diction with respect to offenders or offenses
that by statute or by the law of war may be
tried by military commissions, provost
courts, or other military tribunals.24
If the UCMJ and other statutes do not vest the President with
the authority to create military commissions, that authority, if it
10. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000). The UCMJ is a comprehensive collection of statutes that are the skeleton and much of the flesh of today's military justice system.
11. UCMJ art. 16 (2000).
12. Jd. arts. 2-3, 17-21.
13. [d. arts. 77-134.
14. Id. art. 36.
15. Jd. arts. 59-76.
16. WNTHROP, supra note 9, at 831; see In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 10 (1946); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,27 (1942).
17. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26.
18. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls. 1, 10-11, 14, 18.
19. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10.
20. Id. art. 11, § 2, cl. 1.
21. See UCMJ arts. 18, 21, 28, 36-37, 47-50, 58 (arguably), 104, 106 (2000).
22. See id.
23. Id. art. 18.
24. Id. art. 21.
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exists, must be inherent to the President as Commander in Chief
of the military.
Critical to this position is the concurrent jurisdiction lan-
guage of Article 21. Given the significance of this Article, it
bears further discussion. Article 21 was enacted in 1950 as part
of the original UCMJ, and was derived verbatim from Article
of War 15.25 Perhaps because Article 21 was a wholesale adop-
tion of Article of War 15, there was little discussion of it in the
legislative history of the UCMJ.26 Thus, to understand the
intent of Article 21, it is necessary to examine the legislative
history of Article of War 15.
Article of War 15 came into existence as part of the 1916
revisions to the Articles of War.2 The chief proponent of Arti-
cle 15 was Major General Enoch H. Crowder, the Judge Advo-
cate General of the U.S. Army between 1911-1923.2 General
Crowder testified before the House of Representatives and the
Senate on the necessity of Article 15. General Crowder
described the military commission as a "common law of war"
court.2 9 He pointed out that the "constitution, composition,
and jurisdiction of these courts have never been regulated by
statute,""3 but "itsjurisdiction as a war court has been upheld by
the Supreme Court of the United States." 1 General Crowder
argued that Article 15 was necessary to make clear that expan-
sion of courts-martial jurisdiction did not preempt the jurisdic-
tion of military commissions." General Crowder concluded
his testimony before the Senate by stating that Article 15 would
insure that military commissions would "continue to be gov-
erned as heretofore by the laws of war rather than statute."33
General Crowder's testimony before Congress supports the
argument that Article of War 15, and thus Article 21 of the
UCMJ, is a recognition of the jurisdiction of military commis-
sions to try alleged violations of the laws of war. By recogniz-
ing the jurisdiction of military commissions without an express
statutory grant of authority, Congress has effectively acknowl-
edged the constitutional authority of the President to convene
commissions.
Customary International Law
Although customary international law cannot bestow upon
the President any authority he does not already possess through
the Constitution, it can help to explain what powers are gener-
ally considered inherent to military command. International
law recognizes the authority of a nation, and in particular, mil-
itary commanders, to try war criminals by military commis-
sion.34 Military courts have been used to try violators of the
laws of war from medieval times, 35 including the American
Revolutionary War,36 the Mexican American War,3 the Civil
War,3" and World War I[.3 Besides the United States, Great
Britain,4" Germany,41 France,42 Italy,4" the Soviet Union,44 Aus-
tralia, the Philippines, 4 5 and China have all used military com-
missions to try individuals accused of war crimes.46
25. H.R. Doc. No. 81-491, at 17 (1949); S. REP. No. 81-486, at 13 (1949).
26. The House and Senate hearings discussed military commissions, however, the discussion focused on little more than defining the meaning of the term "military
commission." The House and Senate reports mention commissions, but only indicate that military commissions have been recognized by the Supreme Court and that
Article 21 is derived from Article of War 15.
27. Revision o/the Articles of War, Hearing on H.R. 23,628 Be/ore the House Comm. on Military A//airs, 62d Cong. 35 (May 21, 1912) (statement of Brigadier
General Enoch H. Crowder, Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army) [hereinafter Crowder Testimony]; REVISION OF THE ARTICLES OF WAR, S. REP. No. 63-229, at 53
(1914).
28. JONATtN LURIE, ARMING MILITARY JUSTICE 47 (1992).
29. Id. at 35.
30. Id.
31. REVISION OF THE ARTICLES OF WAR, supra note 27, at 53.
32. Id. General Crowder argued that Article 15 was necessary because proposed changes to the Articles of'War would give jurisdiction to courts-martial to try "per-
sons subject to military law." Id. If courts-martial jurisdiction was expanded to included "persons subject to military law," then courts-martial, in addition to military
commissions, would have jurisdiction over those who violate the laws of war. General Crowder urged that without Article 15, the question would arise whether Con-
gress had ousted the jurisdiction of military commissions. Jd.
33. Id. at 35.
34. Wigfall Green, The Military Commission, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 832, 832 (1948).
35. Harold Wayne Elliott, Trial and Punishment of War Criminals 46 (1998) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file with author).
36. Green, supra note 34, at 832.
37. WINTHROP, supra note 9, at 832.
38. Id. at 833.
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During the twentieth century, when the international com-
munity joined together to try war criminals, it relied upon the
jurisdictional authority of military courts as the platform for its
trials. After World War I, the allies demanded that Germans
suspected of committing war crimes be turned over for trial
before a military court.4 7 After World War II, over ten nations
took part in the International Military Tribunals in the Far
East.4" The Tribunals in the Far East were provided for in the
Potsdam Declaration and convened by order of General Dou-
glas McArthur, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers.49
The international war crimes trials at Nuremberg were military
tribunals. Although France, Great Britain, the United States,
and the Soviet Union agreed upon the trials in the London
Agreement of 8 August 1945, military officers signed the
orders that actually established the International Military Tribu-
nal,5" and the trials were before military courts. 1
Under customary international law, the right of a military
commander to establish and use military commissions to try
suspected war criminals is inherent to his authority as a com-
mander. By making the President the commander of the U.S.
military forces, the Constitution vests the President with that
authority generally associated with command, including the
authority to create military commissions.
Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court confirmed the President's inherent
authority to establish military commissions. The Court dis-
cussed this authority in three landmark cases. In Exparte Qui-
Tin 2 and In re Yamashita,53 the Court acknowledged that both
the President and Congress have authority regarding military
commissions, but neither case defines the President's authority
to establish military commissions in the absence of an express
grant from Congress.5 4 The Court took this further step in Mad-
sen v. Kinsella," concluding that absent congressional action to
the contrary, the President has the authority as Commander in
Chief to create military commissions."
Perhaps the most well-known case regarding military com-
missions, Ex parte Quirin involved the trial of eight German
soldiers who had infiltrated the United States in 1942 with the
intent to sabotage war facilities." After being captured, the
soldiers were tried before a military commission in accordance
39. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
40. WvTNTHRoP, supra note 9, at 831 n.64; HOWARD S. LEVIE, TERRORISM TN WAR: THE LAW OF WR CRIMES 105 (1993).
41. LEVIE, supra note 40, at 20.
42. Id. at 19.
43. Id. at 119.
44. Id. at 127.
45. Id. at 176.
46. [d. at 177.
47. Id. at 26-27. Although the Germans were never turned over, the fact that the Allies intended to try the Germans before a military court supports the position that
international law recognizes the jurisdiction of military courts to try war criminals. [d.
48. United States and Ten Other Nations v. Araki and Twenty-Seven Other Defendants, Transcripts of the International Japanese War Crimes Trials, vol. 1, 1 (1946)
(on file with the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia).
49. Id. at 105-06, 123.
50. 1 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nurenberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 1946-1949; Trials of War Criminals Before the Nurenberg
Military Tribunal, vol. 1, The Medical Case, XVI (1949); Military Government-Germany, United States Zone, Ordinance No. 7, Feb. 17, 1947.
51. JOHN A. APPLEMAN, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (1954).
52. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
53. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
54. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29; Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 10.
55. 343 U.S. 72 (1952).
56. Id. at 348.
57. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21.
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with an order from President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The gov-
ernment charged the saboteurs with violating the law of war;
Article of War 81, relieving intelligence to the enemy; and Arti-
cle of War 82, spying. The saboteurs were also charged with
conspiracy to violate Articles 81 and 82.58 The petitioners filed
a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, and the Supreme Court
heard the writ on an expedited review. The proceedings before
the military commission were suspended pending the Supreme
Court's ruling.59
The petitioners in Quirin claimed that the President's order
appointing a military commission was without constitutional or
statutory authority. The Court disagreed, principally on statu-
tory grounds. Although the Court discussed the President's
constitutional authority regarding military commissions, it
stated that "[it is unnecessary for present purposes to deter-
mine to what extent the President as Commander in Chief has
constitutional power to create military commissions without the
support of Congressional legislation. For here Congress has
authorized trial of offenses against the law of war before such
commissions."6 Pointing to several Articles of War, the Court
ruled that Congress had authorized military commissions by
recognizing their jurisdiction and authorizing the President to
establish rules for their conduct.
Although the Quirin Court did not resolve to what extent the
President had the authority to appoint military commissions, it
set the stage for the case that eventually would. In Quirin, the
Court discussed the President's constitutional role in the cre-
ation of military commissions. The Court pointed out that "the
Constitution... invests the President, as Commander in Chief,
with the power to wage war which Congress has declared."62 It
also observed, "An important incident to the conduct of war is
the adoption of measures by the military commander ... to
seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who
in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have vio-
lated the law of war."63 Thus, when the President is executing
a military action specifically authorized by Congress, he is per-
mitted to create military commissions incident to the execution
of that military operation.64
The Court's conclusions and reasoning in Quirin regarding
the President's authority to appoint military commissions were
echoed in In re Yamashita.5 Yamashita involved the prosecu-
tion of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the Commanding Gen-
eral of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippines. General
Yamashita was tried and convicted by military commission for
violations of the law of war in connection with his command of
the Fourteenth Japanese Army Group.66
One of General Yamashita's allegations of error was that the
commission that tried him was not lawful.67 In answering this
question, the Court reiterated its position in Quirin that Con-
gress, through Article 15, had recognized the authority of mili-
tary commanders to try violations of the law of war at a military
commission."
Based on this premise, the only question left to the Court
regarding the lawfulness of the commission was whether it had
been properly convened. The Court found that the President
58. Id at 23.
59. Id. at 20.
60. Id. at 29.
61. Jd. at 26.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 28.
64. Jd. The Quirin Court stated:
By his [the President's] Order creating the present commission he has undertaken to exercise the authority conferred upon him by Congress and
also such authority as the Constitution itself give the Commander in Chief, to direct the performance of those functions which may constitu-
tionally be performed by the military arma of the nation in time of war.
Jd. Some may argue that the President's authority in Quinn to create a military commission was critically linked to Congress's declaration of war. The Court gave
no indications, however, that Congress's declaration of war carried with it any greater significance than an authorization to conduct a military action that was some-
thing less than war. This issue is discussed at length by Professor Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith in an upcoming article entitled The Constitutional Validioy
ol'Military Commissions, 5 Green Bag 2d (forthcoming Spring 2002). Bradley and Goldsmith point out in that article: "A congressional declaration of war is not
necessary in order for the President to exercise his independent or statutorily-delegated war powers." Id.
65. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
66. Id. at 5.
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id. at 7.
MARCH 2002 THE ARMY LAWYER ° DA PAM 27-50-350
had directed General Yamashita be tried by military commis-
sion and the commission itself was convened by order of Gen-
eral Wilhelm D. Styer.69 General Styer was Commanding
General of the U.S. Army Forces in the Western Pacific, which
included the Philippines. The Philippines was the location
where the petitioner had committed his offenses, surrendered,
was detained pending trial, and where the military commission
was conducted."0 Based on these facts, the Court concluded,
"[I]t... appears that the order creating the commission for the
trial of [the] petitioner was authorized by military command,
and was in complete conformity to the Act of Congress sanc-
tioning the creation of such tribunals."71 Thus, the Court found
it unnecessary to discuss the President's authority regarding
military commissions in any greater detail then it had in Quirin.
Seven years after Yamashita, the Supreme Court decided
Madsen v. Kinsella,2 and resolved the question of the Presi-
dent's inherent authority to create military commission. The
Madsen case came to the Supreme Court through a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus submitted by Mrs. Yvette J. Madsen. In
1950, a military commission convicted Mrs. Madsen, a native-
born U.S. citizen, of murdering her husband, a lieutenant in the
U.S. Air Force, in their military quarters in Frankfurt, Germany.
Mrs. Madsen was tried before a military commission in the
American Zone of Occupied Germany.73
Madsen made a number ofjurisdictional attacks on the mil-
itary commission that convicted her. Among the errors alleged
were that: (1) Madsen should have been tried by a courts-mar-
tial rather than a military commission, (2) the commission
lacked jurisdiction over the offenses for which Madsen was
tried, and (3) the commission itself was unconstitutional.74 The
Court rejected each of these claims, stating, "[i]n the absence of
attempts by Congress to limit the President's power, it appears
that, as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, he may, in time of war, establish and prescribe
the jurisdiction and procedure of military commissions."' 75 The
Court emphasized that Congress had made no attempt to limit
the President's power regarding commissions. Rather than
attempting to limit the President's authority to appoint military
commissions, Congress recognized and sanctioned this author-
ity in Article of War 15.76
In Madsen the Supreme Court clarified an issue that hung
conspicuously unanswered in Quirin and Yamashita. Both Qui-
rin and Yamashita emphasized that Congress and the President
had authority in the area of military commissions, but the Court
did not articulate the extent of the President's authority.77 In
Madsen, the Court resolved the issue, concluding that, absent
congressional action to the contrary, the power to create mili-
tary commissions is inherent in the President as Commander in
Chief.
The shared power to create military commissions is unusual
in a government predicated on the necessity of a separation of
powers; it lies in what Justice Jackson called "a zone of twilight
in which [the President] and Congress may have concurrent
authority."" Although this authority appears to be concurrent,
it is not equal. The President's authority to establish military
commissions is subject to Congress's power to limit that
authority."" This hierarchy of power is logical given that the
Constitution expressly grants Congress the authority to create
military commissions,"0 while the President's authority must be
implied from his role as Commander in Chief of the armed
forces.1
This brief examination of constitutional authority for the
creation of courts-martial and military commissions demon-
strates that these two types of courts are fundamentally differ-
ent. The authority to create courts-martial jurisdiction rests
with Congress alone. The Constitution vests in Congress alone
the authority to create rules and regulations for the governance
of the armed forces. In contrast, the authority to create military
commissions is vested in both Congress and the President.
69. Id. at 11.
70. Id. at 10.
71. Id. at 11.
72. 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
73. Id. at 343.
74. Id. at 342.
75. Id. at 348.
76. Id. at 354.
77. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,26 (1942); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1,7 (1946).
78. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952).
79. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 348.
80. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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Based on the UCMJ's legislative history, international law, and
Supreme Court precedent, this shared authority arises from mil-
itary commissions' function as a tool for the execution of war.
Section II: Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial
and Military Commissions
In addition to a distinctly different source of constitutional
authority, the respective jurisdictions of military commissions
and courts-martial are also different. Jurisdiction is a funda-
mental issue in every case. No criminal trial may proceed
unless the court conducting the trial has jurisdiction over the
person being tried and the subject matter in issue. 2 The fact
that the jurisdiction of courts-martial overlaps with military
commissions in some areas may contribute to the misconcep-
tion that courts-martial and military commissions are one in the
same. To remove any confusion and to highlight the differences
between the two courts, this section will discuss and describe
the jurisdiction of courts-martial and military commissions.
Courts-Martial
The UCMJ establishes personal jurisdiction for courts-mar-
tial at Articles 5 and 17. Article 17 states that "[e]ach armed
force has courts-martial jurisdiction over all persons subject to
this chapter," 3 and Article 5 states that this jurisdiction "applies
to all places."" This general grant of jurisdiction can be exer-
cised at three levels of courts-martial: general, special, or sum-
mary. Articles 18, 19, and 20 define the jurisdictional
limitations of these courts. The main distinction between these
courts is the maximum punishment each is authorized to
impose.15 The UCMJ authorizes general courts-martial to
impose "any punishment not forbidden by [the Code], includ-
ing the penalty of death,"6 while special and summary courts
martial punishments are considerably more limited.1
7
The phrase "persons subject to this chapter" appears in Arti-
cles 17 through 20, and describes the individuals over whom
courts-martial jurisdiction may be exercised. Article 2 of the
UCMJ defines this phrase as including individuals in the mili-
tary on active duty,8 members of the National Guard and
Reserves in certain circumstances, 9 enemy prisoners while in
custody, 9 retired service members, 9 and individuals accompa-
nying a military force in times of war.92 In addition to individ-
81. Congress has exercised its authority regarding defining and punishing violations of the law of nations by, among other actions, authorizing the trial of violations
of the law of war at courts-martial or military commission. By expressly recognizing the jurisdiction of military commissions in Article 21, UCMJ, and authorizing
the President to prescribe rules for their conduct in Article 36, UCMJ, Congress has provided express authorization for the commissions. As noted by Justice Jackson
in Youngstown Sheet: "When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that
he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate." 343 U.S. at 635.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Baucum, 80 F.3d 539, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 879 (1996); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1344
(9th Cir. 1999), vacated on other grounds, 508 U.S. 1201 (1992).
83. UCMJ art. 17 (2000).
84. Id. art. 5.
85. Id. arts. 18-20. In addition to distinctions in the maximum punishment each court is authorized to impose, there are due process and composition differences as
well. As the maximum punishment a soldier is exposed to decreases so does the process due. For example, all contested general courts-martial must go through an
Article 32 investigation before being brought to trial, while special and summary courts-martial do not. Id. art. 32. The minimum number of panel members necessary
to create a quorum at a general court-martial is five, at a special it is three, while summary courts-martial are presided over by one officer. Id. art. 16.
86. Id. art 18.
87. Id. arts. 18-20. According to UCMJ article 19, special courts-martial may impose no punishment greater than a bad conduct discharge, one year in confinement,
hard labor without confinement for three months, and two-thirds forfeiture of pay for one year. Id. art. 19. This jurisdiction has been further limited by the President,
as authorized by Congress, in Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 201(f)(2)(B)(i). MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 201(t)(B)(i) (2000) [here-
inafter MCM]. Summary court-martial jurisdiction is discussed in UCMJ article 20. The maximum punishment at a summary court-martial is confinement for one
month, hard labor without confinement for forty-five days, restriction for two months, and forfeiture of two-thirds pay for one month. UCMJ art. 20. Neither a special
nor a summary courts-martial may impose the death penalty, dismissal, or a dishonorable discharge. Id. arts. 19-20.
88. Id. arts. 2(a)(1)-(2).
89. Id. arts. 2(a)(3), (5)-(6).
90. Id. art. 2(a)(9).
91. Id. art. 2(a)(4).
92. Id. arts. 2(a)(10)-(l1). Article 2 also defines "persons subject to this chapter" as including "persons in custody of the armed forces serving a sentence imposed
by a courts-martial" and people occupying an area which the United States has leased, reserved, or otherwise acquired which is outside the United States, the Canal
Zone, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. Id. art. 2.
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uals described in Article 2, general courts-martial have personal
jurisdiction over those accused of violating the laws of war.
Article 18 provides that "[g]eneral courts-martial... have juris-
diction to try any persons who by the law of war is subject to
trial by a military tribunal and may adjudge any punishment
permitted by the law of war."93
Besides describing the three levels of courts-martial, Arti-
cles 18, 19, and 20, also describe the subject-matter jurisdiction
of those courts. Each court has jurisdiction to try "any offense
made punishable by this chapter."94 Articles 77 through 134
describe the offenses that are made punishable by the UCMJ.
General courts-martial also have the added subject-matter juris-
diction over any violation of the laws of war that could be tried
at a military commission. 95
Military Commissions
Because court-martial jurisdiction is established by statute,
it is a relatively simple task to read the statute and understand
who can be tried for what crimes by courts-martial. This task
is more complex with military commissions. To determine the
jurisdiction of military commissions, three zones ofjurisdiction
must be considered: customary international law, international
treaties, and the Constitution. These three zones ofjurisdiction
must be considered and laid over one another to determine the
jurisdiction of military commissions.
Jurisdictional Limitations lmposed by Custom and History
Military commissions have been used throughout American
and international history. These courts have not always been
called military commissions; before the term military commis-
sion came into use they were called courts-martial, courts of
inquiry, or special courts-martial. 96 From the historical use of
these commissions, customary international law regarding their
jurisdiction can be discerned. The jurisdictional boundaries of
these tribunals have evolved and been refined, arguably to
accommodate the changing nature of warfare. This evolution
and refinement is illustrated particularly well in U.S. history.
As explained by General Crowder in his testimony before
Congress, and by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin, In re
Yamashita, and Madsen, U.S. military commissions have
drawn their jurisdiction to try cases from customary interna-
tional law.97 (General Crowder and the Supreme Court often
used the term "international common law" when referring to
what is more commonly referred to as "customary international
law.") Therefore, a historical examination of the evolution and
refinement of American military commissions reflects the
evolving nature of customary international law.
The United States has used military commissions since
before the ratification of the Constitution9" and as late as 1950
in occupied Germany. 99 Customary international law, Supreme
Court precedent, and U.S. history indicate that three distinct
types of military commissions have been used: martial law
courts, military government courts, and war courts."' Each
type of military commission has unique jurisdictional charac-
teristics. Martial law courts refer to courts established by a mil-
itary commander whose forces have occupied a particular area
within the United States and displaced the civil government.
Military government courts are the same as martial law courts,
except they are established either outside of the United States
or in areas within the United States in a state of rebellion.
Finally, war courts are established by military commanders
strictly for the purpose of trying violations of the laws of war.1
American Commissions in Their Infancy
One of the first and most famous military commissions in
the United States, the trial of Major John Andr6, was a war
court. Andre, the Adjutant General to the British Army in
North America, was captured after meeting with Major General
Benedict Arnold in September 1780.102 At the meeting, Gen-
eral Arnold gave Andr6 copies of the defense plans for the mil-
itary post at West Point."' 3 Andr6 still possessed the plans at the
93. Id. art. 18.
94. Id. arts. 18-20.
95. Id. art. 18.
96. WENTHROP, supra note 9, at 831-32; WNTHROP SERGENT, THE LFE OF MAJOR ANDRE 347 (1871).
97. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346 (1952); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1,20 (1946); Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,30 (1942); Crowder Testimony, supra note 27.
98. WENTHROP, supra note 9, at 831-32.
99. See, e.g., Madsen, 343 U.S. at 341.
100. See MCM, supra note 87, pt. 1, 2. Part 1, paragraph 2 of the MCM describes military jurisdiction. The MCM lists four distinct areas within military jurisdiction:
military law, martial law, military government, and the law of war. Id.
101. Id.
102. SERGENT, supra note 96, at 347.
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time of his capture. General George Washington ordered Major
Andr6 tried for the offense of spying. A military commission
found Andr6 guilty and sentenced him to death." 4
Although the trial of Major Andr6 was controversial, this
was not due to jurisdictional issues. The jurisdiction to try
enemy soldiers for war crimes at a military commission was
well established by 1780. Indeed it would be difficult for the
British to claim that the trial ordered by General Washington
lacked jurisdiction, given Britain's use of a less formal proceed-
ing to find Nathan Hale guilty and execute him four years ear-
lier for the same offense.
1 0 5
A more controversial use of a military commission occurred
when General Andrew Jackson ordered the trial of a non-mili-
tary U.S. citizen at one of the first martial law courts in the
United States. In December of 1814, prior to the Battle of New
Orleans, General Jackson declared a state of martial law in the
city of New Orleans. 06 Jackson prepared the city for a siege,
and to that end, he established curfews and pass policies.
107
Individuals found in violation of Jackson's curfew or pass pol-
icy faced arrest. Jackson also ordered military personnel to
enter private homes to commandeer entrenching tools or other
supplies he deemed necessary to the war effort.01 After win-
ning the Battle of New Orleans, General Jackson maintained
the city in a state of martial law, despite the retreat of the British
forces." 9
Jackson's actions drew widespread criticism throughout
New Orleans. One of Jackson's critics was Louis Louaillier, a
member of the Louisiana Legislature. Louaillier wrote an edi-
torial in a local newspaper declaring that the continued state of
martial law was inappropriate and unnecessary.11 Jackson
ordered that Louaillier be arrested and tried by military com-
mission for a number of offenses, including espionage and
inciting mutiny.
An attorney who witnessed Louaillier's arrest filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Louaillier in federal
court. Louaillier's attorney claimed the military court had no
jurisdiction over his client since Louaillier was a civilian. Fed-
eral judge Dominick A. Hall granted the writ, and ordered
Louaillier be presented to his court the next day. Jackson, who
was an attorney by trade, refused to honor the court order, and
had Hall arrested on a charge of aiding and abetting and excit-
ing mutiny.1 A military commission tried Louaillier, but he
was not found guilty of any charge. The commission deter-
mined it did not have jurisdiction to try Louaillier for six of the
seven charges in the case. As to the seventh charge-espio-
nage-the commission found Louaillier not guilty. Jackson
refused, however, to accept the findings of the commission, and
placed Louaillier back into confinement.112
Shortly after the military commission acquitted Louaillier,
news that Britain and the United States had signed a peace
treaty finally reached New Orleans. Upon receiving notice of
the peace agreement, General Jackson lifted the state of martial
law. Jackson also ordered the release of Louaillier and all the
other individuals whom he had ordered arrested based on vio-
lations of martial law.
1 3
Judge Hall wasted little time in issuing an order for Jackson
to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of Judge
Hall's earlier order to release Louaillier. General Jackson made
a number of responses to the court's show cause order, but they
were all rejected. The court found Jackson in contempt and
ordered him to pay a $1000 fine as punishment. Judge Hall
effectively summarized the case of United States v. Jackson by
stating: "The only question was whether the Law should bend
to the General, or the General to the Law."
' 1 4
The declaration of martial law in New Orleans and the trial
of Louis Louaillier, along with the subsequent contempt pro-
ceedings against Jackson in federal court, are historically valu-
103. ROBERT HATCH, MAJOR JOHN ANDRE 243-48 (1986).
104. SERGENT, supra note 96, at 347. The convening order from Washington tasked the court to examine whether "[h]e came within our lines in the night on an
interview with Major General Arnold, and in assumed character; and was taken within our lines, in a disguised habit, with a feigned name, and with the enclosed
papers concealed upon him." Id.
105. HATCH, supra note 103, at 68-69.
106. LURIE, supra note 28, at 12.
107. MARQUIS JAMES, ANDREW JACKSON: THE BORDER CAPTAIN 226 (1933).
108. Id. at 244.
109. Id. at 275.
110. Id. at 282.
111. LURIE, supra note 28, at 12.
112. JAMES, supra note 107, at 283.
113. Id.
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able for two reasons. First, Jackson's use of martial law and a
military court to try Louaillier provides one of the first exam-
ples of a martial law court being used in the United States to try
a non-military U.S. citizen. Second, the trial of Louis
Louaillier illustrates one of the most fundamental jurisdictional
issues in the area of military commissions in the United States:
when may a military commission be used against a U.S. civil-
ian? This question, raised by the events of 1815, arose again in
1866, 1946, and in 1952 with varying results." I
The trials of Major Andr6 and Louis Louaillier are examples
of American military commissions in their infancy. They dem-
onstrate that as early as 1780 and 1815, the United States had
employed military commissions as both war courts and martial
law courts. Although these early cases establish the United
States had used military commissions in the Revolutionary War
and the War of 1812,1 it was not until the Mexican-American
War and the Civil War that the United States employed military
commissions on a large scale.11 7 It was also during these larger
conflicts that the distinction between military government
courts, martial law courts, and war courts achieved greater clar-
ity.
Mexican-American War
During the Mexican-American War in 1847, the U.S. Army
occupied large sections of Mexico. General Winfield Scott, the
commander of those occupied areas, declared a state of martial
law and suspended the authority of the civil government. Indi-
viduals who committed crimes in those occupied areas could be
brought to one of two kinds of military courts: a military com-
mission or a council of war. In 1847, these two military courts
were generally alike, except for their names and the type of
cases they heard. Military commissions were essentially mili-
tary government courts. They were used to try individuals for
crimes that would normally be brought before a civilian crimi-
nal court during peacetime. Councils of war were war courts.
They were used to try violations of the law of war.1 I
During the Mexican American War the jurisdictional limita-
tions of military commissions began to crystallize. 9 Both mil-
itary government courts and war courts faced territorial and
temporal limitations to their subject-matter jurisdiction.
Offenses tried before a commission must have been committed:
(1) in a theater of war, (2) within the territory controlled by the
commander ordering the trial, and (3) during a time of war.2
Additionally, the trial itself had to be conducted within a theater
of war.121 These jurisdictional limitations are arguably still in
place today, but the meaning of the term "theater of war" has
evolved.
Civil War
The Civil War and the subsequent four years entail the most
extensive use of military commissions in U.S. history. The
government conducted over 4000 military commissions during
the war 22 and 1435 more between 1865 and 1869.123 These
commissions, used in the North and the South, tried both mili-
tary personnel and civilians. The charges they heard ranged
from crimes against the laws of war, to acts in violation of Pres-
ident Lincoln's 24 September 1862 proclamation, to crimes
usually cognizable by civil criminal courts. 114 Functioning as
war courts, martial law courts, and military government courts,
respectively, each type of military court was called a military
commission. 5
One of the most controversial uses of military commissions
during the Civil War stemmed from President Lincoln's 24 Sep-
tember 1862 declaration of a state of limited martial law
throughout the country.1 26 Lincoln's proclamation authorized
the use of military commissions to try U.S. civilians in areas
that were not in a zone of occupation or under insurrection, and
114. Id. at 286.
115. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
116. WINTHROP, supra note 9, at 832.
117. Id. at 832-34.
118. WINTHROP, supra note 9, at 832.
119. Id. at 837.
120. Id. at 836-37.
121. Id. at 836.
122. MARK NEELY, THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 168 (1991).
123. Id. at 176.
124. Id. at 168.
125. WINTHROP, supra note 9, at 832.
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suspended the writ of habeas corpus for anyone confined by
military authorities. 2 The use of military commissions in this
context was so questionable that at least one military commis-
sion declared that it did not have jurisdiction to try U.S. civil-
ians outside of a zone of occupation or insurrection.128 Others,
like noted law of war scholar Francis Lieber, believed the com-
missions proper, arguing that because the whole country was at
war, the whole country was within the theater of war.29
Some might argue that the Supreme Court resolved this
debate in 1866 when it decided Ex parte Milligan."3 In Milli-
gan, the Court ruled that military commissions lacked the juris-
diction to try U.S. civilians when the civil courts were still in
operation. The Court also held that the authority to use military
commissions could not arise "from a threatened invasion.
' 3 1
Rather, "the necessity must be actual and present" and the juris-
diction was limited to "the locality of actual war.""' The
majority in Milligan based this ruling not just on an interpreta-
tion of the Constitution, but also on the traditions of England.1"
Despite the Supreme Court's strongly worded denunciation
of military commissions, the scope of the Court's ruling in Ex
parte Milligan was surprisingly limited. The only jurisdictional
limitation placed on military commissions by the Court
regarded their use against civilians in areas not under valid mar-
ital law or occupation. 34 Thus, the ruling had no effect on the
use of commissions in the occupied South or in the case of mil-
itary personnel. 35 In fact, the United States conducted well
over two hundred military commissions after the Milligan deci-
sion.136
Post-Civil War
After the Civil War, it was not until World War II that it was
necessary for the United States to resort to the large-scale use
of military commissions.137 Once again, the United States used
these commissions as war courts, military government courts,
and martial law courts.1 31 Customary international law stan-
dards for jurisdiction remained in place, but, given the global
nature of World War II, the limitation of "the theater of war"
lost much of its relevance. This evolution in the jurisdiction of
military commissions is best illustrated by Exparte Quirin.
In Quirin, the United States tried the petitioners for sabo-
tage, spying, attempting to give intelligence to the enemy, and
conspiracy to commit those crimes. The government alleged
the saboteurs committed these offenses in Florida, New York,
and arguably other states on the east coast of the United States.
After being captured, the petitioners were tried by military
commission in Washington D.C.
139
The location of the petitioners' offenses and their trial are
both significant because neither appears to be within the theater
126. The widespread use of military commissions, military arrests, and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus are some of President Lincoln's most controversial
acts during the Civil War.
127. NEELY, supra note 122, at 65. President Lincoln's proclamation ordered that
during the existing insurrection and as a necessary measure for suppressing the same, all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors within
the United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice, affording aid
and comfort to Rebels against the authority of the United States, shall be subject to martial law and liable to trial and punishment by Courts
Martial or Military Commission.
Id.
128. Id. at 144.
129. Id. at 160.
130. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
131. Id. at 127.
132. Id. at 128; NEELY, supra note 122, at 176.
133. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 128.
134. Id.
135. LURIE, supra note 28, at 42.
136. NEELY, supra note 122, at 177.
137. Id. at 182-83.
138. REPORT OF THE DEPUTY JUDGE ADVOCATE FOR WAR CRIMES: EUROPEAN COMMAND, JUNE 1945 TO JULY 1948 52 (1948) [hereinafter JAG WAR CRIMES REPORT].
139. Eaparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,22-23 (1942).
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of war as that term was defined in the Civil War.1 4 The Court
discussed the petitioners' claim that the military commission
had no jurisdiction over them because they had committed no
"act of depredation or entered the theatre or zone of active mil-
itary operations." '41 The Court resolved the petitioners' claim
by concluding the petitioners completed their crimes when they
passed through U.S. military lines and remained in this coun-
try.142 This answer tacitly agreed with the Attorney General's
brief in Quirin which argued, "The time may now have come.
• . when the exigencies of total and global war must force a rec-
ognition that every foot of this country is within the theatre of
operations." 4 '
From the earliest moments of U.S. history to World War II,
the United States has applied customary international law to
define the jurisdiction of military commissions. Therefore, the
expansion of "the theater of operations" illustrates that Ameri-
can military commission jurisdiction, and thus the jurisdic-
tional limitations imposed by customary international law, have
evolved over time with the changing nature of warfare.
Jurisdictional Limitations Imposed by International Treaties
International treaties further restrict the jurisdiction of mili-
tary commissions. Even if the United States has the authority
under customary international law to conduct a military com-
mission, it would be unable to exercise that authority if it had
entered into a treaty which precluded the use of commissions.
Although the United States is not a signatory to any treaty
expressly forbidding the use of military commissions, it has
entered into several treaties that affect how or when it can use
commissions and the minimum due process necessary at a com-
mission. The most significant of these treaties regarding mili-
tary commissions are the four 1949 Geneva Conventions,
particularly, Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War,144 and Geneva Convention IV Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 
14
1
All four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions were enacted in
response to the events of World War II. The international com-
munity created the Conventions in an effort to establish univer-
sal rules for the protection of the victims of war.146 The
Conventions specifically addressed the treatment of the
wounded and sick in the field and at sea,
147 prisoners of war,1 41
and civilians.149 Among the safeguards provided by these Con-
ventions were due process obligations imposed on any nation
seeking to prosecute individuals during a time of armed con-
flict.L'
140. WINTHROP, supra note 9, at 832.
141. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38. Although the Court did address the theater of war issue relating to where the petitioners crimes were committed, it did not address the
theater of war issue relating to the location of the commission. See id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 46; Michal R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REV. 59, 75 (1980).
144. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened/or signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention 111].
145. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, openedbr signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [herein-
after Geneva Convention IV].
146. JEAN DE PREUX ET AL., COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA CONVENTION: RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR, forward (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958)
[hereinafter DE PREUX]. The forward sections of all of 1949 Geneva Convention commentaries are the same.
147. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened.lbr signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3314, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 1]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea, opened.lbr signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85.
148. Geneva Convention I1, supra note 144.
149. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 145.
150. Geneva Convention 1, supra note 147, art. 3 [hereinafter Common Article 3] (this provision is in all four Conventions, thus referred to as Common Article 3);
Geneva Convention 111, supra note 144 ch. 3; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 145, arts. 64-78. These provisions address the trial or punishment of individuals
during armed conflict.
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With the exception of Common Article 3, all the articles of
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, apply only to "international
armed conflicts."' Thus, the provisions of Geneva Conven-
tions III and IV regarding the jurisdiction of military commis-
sions are only applicable to the situation where a "difference
between two States ... [leads] to the intervention of members
of the armed forces.
1 52
Geneva Convention III
Before the 1949 Conventions, several international agree-
ments had laid substantial groundwork regarding the treatment
of prisoners of war.1 53 Geneva Convention III built upon this
foundation. The trial of prisoners of war was one area of par-
ticular concern after World War II. The Convention devotes
twenty-eight of its 143 articles to the trial and punishment of
prisoners. Articles 4, 84, 85, and 102 are particularly relevant
to the jurisdiction of military commissions.
Under Geneva Convention III, the term "prisoner of war"
does not apply to all those captured by our military during a
time of war. Prisoner of war is defined at Article 4 of Geneva
Convention III, and includes, among others "members of the
armed forces of a party to the conflict; 15 4 "members of militias,
•.. volunteer corps, . . . and organized resistance movements"
who meet certain conditions; 155 and "persons accompanying the
force without actually being members thereto. 1 56 If persons do
not meet the definition contained in Article 4 of the Conven-
tion, then they are not considered to be a prisoner of war and are
not entitled to the protections provided by Geneva Convention
III beyond Common Article 3.157
For those entitled to prisoner of war status, the Convention
recognizes the competency of military courts to try them, with
limitations. Article 84 states that "[a] prisoner of war shall be
tried only by a military court, unless the existing laws of the
Detaining Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a mem-
ber of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect of the
particular offense alleged. 1 5 Although Article 84 recognizes
and even favors the use of military courts to try prisoners of
war, Article 102 limits the kind of military court that may be
employed. Under Article 102 "a prisoner can be validly sen-
tenced only if the sentence has been pronounced by the same
courts according the same procedure as in the case of members
of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. '1 59 Article 85
makes it clear that the limitations established in Article 102
were intended to apply regardless of when a prisoner of war's
crimes were committed. Article 85 states: "[P]risoners of war
prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts com-
mitted prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the bene-
fits of the present Convention." 6 '
Thus, based on Articles 84, 85, and 102, the United States
could only use military commissions to try prisoners of war
when they are used to try U.S. military personnel. Because the
United States does not currently use commissions to try its mil-
itary personnel, it could not use them to try prisoners of war.
Some may argue the above conclusion is flawed, claiming
the United States can use military commissions to try enemy
prisoners of war so long as we could use them to try our own
military. Thus, even if the United States does not customarily
try its own service members by military commissions, the sim-
ple fact that it has the authority to do so is sufficient to meet the
requirements of Articles 84, 85, and 102. This argument fails
for two reasons.
151. Common Article 3, supra note 150.
152. DE PRux, supra note 146, at 23.
153. Id. at 3-4.
154. Geneva Convention 111, supra note 144, art. 4(A)(1).
155. Id. art. 4(A)(2).
156. Id. art. 4(A)(4).
157. When the status of an individual is in question, the Convention provides a mechanism for resolving the issue. Article 5 provides:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any
of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has
been determined by a competent tribunal.
Id. art. 5. Thus, when it is unclear whether an individual meets Article 4's definition of prisoner of war, the detaining power can conduct a tribunal to determine that
individual's status.
158. Id. art. 84. Thus, Article 84 "establishes the competence of military courts." DE PREUX, supra note 146, at 412.
159. Geneva Convention 111, supra note 144, art. 102.
160. Id. art. 85.
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First, the language of Article 102 is inconsistent with such
an interpretation. Article 102 states: "A prisoner of war can be
validly sentenced only if the sentence has been pronounced by
the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case
of the members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power." '61
Those supporting the argument that we can use military com-
missions to try prisoners of war even when we are not using
them to try our own service men and women seek to rewrite
Article 102. This new Article 102 would read: "A prisoner of
war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been pro-
nounced by the same court that could be used to try the armed
forces of the Detaining Power, according to the same procedure
that could be used in the case of members of the armed forces
of the Detaining Power." Nothing in Article 102 or the Com-
mentary to the Article supports such an interpretation.
The second reason such an argument fails is that it would
undercut the objectives of Article 85. Article 85 was created,
at least in part, to address the situation when members of the
armed forces of a nation were not afforded the protections of the
1929 Geneva Convention because their crimes were alleged to
have been committed before capture.162 The Commentary to
Article 85 specifically cites to In re Yamashita as an example of
what the drafters of Article 85 sought to avoid. Those that
would argue that Article 85 only requires a nation to try prison-
ers of war by those courts that it could have used to try its own
service members ignore the objectives of Article 85, to include
the objective of preventing a repeat of Yamashita. In 1946, the
United States could have used military commissions to try its
own personnel, it simply did not. Accordingly, if General
Yamashita were tried today, a military commission could still
try him. It seems extremely unlikely that the drafters and sig-
natories of Geneva Convention III intended Article 85 to be so
impotent.
The interplay between Articles 84, 85, and 102 are particu-
larly significant for the United States. During World War 11, the
United States used military commissions to try prisoners of war
for violations of the laws of war committed prior to capture.
1 63
The United States, howevei did not use military commissions
to try its own soldiers, regardless of when the infractions were
alleged to have been committed.1 64 This distinction was signif-
icant. The Manual for Courts-Martial in effect in 1945 placed
restrictions on the use of hearsay evidence and deposed testi-
mony; military commissions were not bound by these restric-
tions. 1 65 This fact was highlighted by De Preux in his
Commentary on Article 85 and cited to as one of the reasons for
Article 85.166 Thus, based on Articles 84, 85, and 102, it seems
that the United States could not exercise military commission
jurisdiction today as it did during the Second World War. If the
United States wished to take an enemy prisoner of war to a mil-
itary commission, it could do so only if it used military commis-
sions to try its own soldiers.
Geneva Convention IV
In addition to the new restrictions on military commissions
established in Geneva Convention III, Geneva Convention IV
also places greater limitations on the use of military commis-
sions in an international armed conflict. While the restrictions
placed on the use of military commissions by Geneva Conven-
tion III seem to be directed to war courts, the restrictions in
Geneva Convention IV go principally to military government
courts. This focus is logical given the Convention's objective
of protecting civilians in the time of war.
Civilians are perhaps at their most vulnerable when in the
hands of an occupying military force. Thus, Geneva Conven-
tion IV provides detailed provisions regarding the trial of civil-
ians in occupied territories.1 67 The provisions of Geneva
Convention IV relevant to the jurisdiction of military commis-
sions are Articles 64, 66, and 70.
Article 64 demonstrates the strong preference to try civilians
in an occupied territory before their own courts: "[S]ubject to
the latter consideration of justice and to the necessity of ensur-
ing the effective administration of justice, the tribunals of the
occupied territory shall continue to function in respect of all
offenses covered by the said laws. 1 6 By encouraging the con-
tinued use of court systems in operation before occupation, the
Convention allows civilians in occupied areas to avoid facing
"a lack of understanding or prejudice on the part of a people of
foreign mentality, traditions or doctrines."
1 69
161. Id. art. 102.
162. DE PREUX, supra note 146, at 413-16.
163. JAG WAR CRIMES REPORT, supra note 138, at 46-51.
164. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1946); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 790 (1950).
165. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 20-21.
166. DE PREux, supra note 146, at 413.
167. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 145, arts. 64-78.
168. Id. art. 64.
169. DE PREUX, supra note 146, at 336.
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Although Article 64 demonstrates a preference for maintain-
ing the preexisting courts of an occupied area, this preference is
not without restriction. The preexisting courts will not be used:
(1) if the court system itself is contrary to Geneva Convention
IV or has "been instructed to apply inhumane or discriminatory
laws,"170 or (2) if the preexisting court system cannot administer
justice effectively.1 Thus, except when the preexisting courts
of an occupied territory are unwilling or unable to provide jus-
tice, those courts should be used to try offenses that were crim-
inal before occupation.
Besides establishing the presumption that the criminal
courts in operation before an occupation will continue to
administer the civilian criminal justice system, Article 64 also
contains provisions that enable an occupying force to create
laws necessary for the efficient conduct of the military govern-
ment and for the protection of the occupying force. The second
paragraph of Article 64 states:
[T]he Occupying Power may, however, sub-
ject the population of the occupied territory
to provisions which are essential to enable
the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations
under the present Convention, to maintain
the orderly government of the territory, and
to ensure the security of the Occupying
Power, of the members and property of the
occupying forces or administration, and like-
wise of the establishments and lines of com-
munication used by them. 72
De Preux characterized the above section as the "legislative
powers of the occupant."' This legislative power is particu-
larly important with regard to the jurisdiction of military com-
missions under the Convention.
Although Geneva Convention IV favors trials of civilians in
their country's own courts, this is not true of offenses made
criminal under the occupying power's legislative authority.
Under Article 66 of Geneva Convention IV, "[iun cases of a
breach of the penal provisions promulgated by it in virtue of the
second paragraph of Article 64, the occupying power may hand
over the accused to its properly constituted, non-political mili-
tary courts, on condition that said courts sit in the occupied
country."'1 4 Article 66 allows the occupying power the jurisdic-
tion to punish those who violate the legislation created by that
power.
The last section of Geneva Convention IV regarding the
jurisdiction of military commissions is Article 70, which states:
"[P]rotected persons shall not be arrested, prosecuted or con-
victed by the Occupying Power for acts committed or for opin-
ions expressed before the occupation, or during a temporary
interruption thereof, with the exception of breaches of the laws
and customs of war."1 5 This Article limits the occupying
power's jurisdiction to offenses committed during the time of
actual occupation. The one exception to this general rule is for
"breaches of the laws and customs of war."1 76 This exception is
based on the principle of universal jurisdiction, under which an
individual who violates the law of war, violates international
law. 177 "The punishment of such crimes is therefore as much
the duty of a State which becomes the Occupying Power as of
the offender's own home country.
1 7
The limitations imposed by Articles 64, 66, and 70 of
Geneva Convention IV restrict the customary international law
jurisdiction of a military commission operating in an occupied
territory. In an occupied territory, the United States can only try
civilians at a military commission for violations of the rules the
United States established after becoming an occupying force, or
for violations of the law of war.
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions represent a turning point
in the international law of armed conflict. Their provisions
touch a wide variety of issues regarding the conduct of war to
include the subject of military commissions. The significance
of Geneva Conventions III and IV to the jurisdictional bound-
aries of military commissions is considerable. Both Conven-
tions create limitations on the exercise of military commission
jurisdiction, whether that commission is in the form of a mili-
tary government court or a war court. Depending on the status
of the individual the United States is seeking to try, U.S. prac-
tices that were arguably permissible during World War 11 are
likely no longer acceptable.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 145, art. 64.
173. DE PR.ux, supra note 146, at 337.
174. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 145, art. 66.
175. Id. art. 70.
176. Id.
177. DE PR.ux, supra note 146, at 350.
178. Id.
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Constitutional Restrictions on the Exercise of Military
Commission Jurisdiction
This article has already discussed several landmark Supreme
Court decisions regarding military commissions. These cases
have been discussed as they related to the constitutional author-
ity to create commissions and the historical evolution of the use
of military commissions in the United States. This section
revisits these Supreme Court opinions and others that define the
jurisdiction of military commissions under the Constitution.
This section will examine these opinions as they relate to two
critical jurisdictional issues. First, under what circumstances
may a military commission exercise jurisdiction over a U.S.
civilian? Second, when may a commission try foreign nation-
als?
Jurisdiction of Commissions Over U.S. Civilians
The trial of U.S. civilians by military commission is perhaps
the most controversial issue in any discussion of thejurisdiction
of military commissions. When American civilians are sub-
jected to the jurisdiction of U.S. military courts, it strikes a dis-
harmonious chord in the American psyche. The United States
was born out of the struggle to throw off the oppression
imposed by the British government through its military.179 The
Framers of the Constitution feared the military, some believing
that standing armies posed a threat to a free society. Thus, in
drafting the Constitution, the Framers strictly subordinated the
military to civilian control.1"' Based on this historical and con-
stitutional construction, the Supreme Court has stated that mil-
itary commissions can be used to try U.S. civilians only under
specific extreme circumstance during war."'
The Supreme Court has addressed the jurisdiction of mili-
tary commissions to try U.S. civilians in numerous cases, four
of which are particularly relevant. In Ex Parte Milligan,"2
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, "3 Madsen v. Kinsella,"'4 and Ex parte
Quirin,I the Supreme Court provides some clear boundaries
for the application of military commission jurisdiction over
U.S. civilians. These boundaries vary depending on where the
commission is held and what type of commission is being con-
ducted. The Court subjects martial law courts to the greater
restrictions than military government courts conducted in occu-
pied territories 6 and war courts.
Martial Law Courts
As mentioned above, martial law courts conducted against
U.S. civilians face greater restriction on their exercise of juris-
diction than other types of military commissions. These restric-
tions are discussed and illustrated in Ex parte Milligan and
Duncan v. Kahanamoku.' Although some have argued that
"the Milligan decision had little practical effect," ' this criti-
cism is directed principally at the Court's failure to address the
use of military commissions in the occupied South, the military
detentions authorized by the President, or the President's act of
suspending the writ of habeas corpus."' For the purposes of
establishing jurisdictional boundaries for military commis-
sions, Milligan still has relevance.
Members of the U.S. military arrested Lambdin P. Milligan
on 5 October 1864 and tried him by military commission on the
21st of that month. 9 ' Military authorities alleged that Milligan
conspired against the government of the United States, afforded
aid and comfort to the enemy, incited insurrection, violated the
laws of war, and engaged in disloyal practices. The commis-
sion found him guilty and sentenced him to death. All of the
criminal acts alleged against Milligan were committed in the
state of Indiana, and stemmed from his membership in an orga-
nization called the Order of American Knights or Sons of Lib-
179. BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 95, 112-19 (1967).
180. Id. at 61-63.
181. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946). The Supreme Court has never said that a declared state of war
was necessary for the use of military commissions. Rather, the extreme circumstances created by warfare may necessitate andjustify the use of military commissions.
182. Milligan, 71 U.S. at2.
183. Duncan, 327 U.S. at 304.
184. 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
185. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
186. The phrase "occupied territories" is intended to refer to locations outside of the United States and its territories.
187. 71 U.S. at 126-27; 327 U.S. at 319-23.
188. NEELY, supra note 122, at 176.
189. Id.
190. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 107.
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erty. 91 At the time the U.S. military tried Milligan by
commission, the civilian courts in Indiana were open and in
operation.
The issue that occupied the majority of the Court's opinion
was "upon the facts stated [did] . . . the military commission
[have] jurisdiction legally to try and sentence ... Milligan." '92
The Court answered this question with a resounding "no.""19 In
arriving at that answer, the Court used what one author called
"thunderously quotable language." '94 The majority concluded,
"[M]artial rule can never exist where the courts are open."
'1 95
Although "there are occasions when martial rule can be prop-
erly applied," '196 those occasions are limited to when due to
"foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed."1 97
The thrust of the majority opinion is that military courts created
in a state of martial rule to try civilians are courts of necessity
and "as necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for, if
this government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is
a gross usurpation of power."' 91
Despite claims that the Milligan opinion is irrelevant, it is
still significant where martial law courts are established within
the borders of the United States. The decision creates strict
guidelines intended to limit the jurisdiction of martial law
courts to the smallest physical area for the briefest period of
time. The Court created these limitations based on the recogni-
tion that "civil liberty and this kind of martial law cannot
endure together; the antagonism is irreconcilable; and in the
conflict, one or the other must perish." 199 Eighty years after the
Milligan decision, the Supreme Court once again visited the
question of whether a martial law court had the jurisdiction to
try U.S. civilians.
In Duncan v. Kahanamoku,2 0 the Court reached the same
conclusions as in Milligan, although for slightly different rea-
sons. Two days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
Hawaii, President Roosevelt approved the Governor of
Hawaii's declaration of martial law in accordance with the
Hawaiian Organic Act.2"1 After this declaration, the command-
ing general in that area declared himself the Military Governor
and ordered the civil and criminal courts to close. The Military
Governor then established military tribunals in the place of the
civilian criminal courts.202 Duncan arose out of two prosecu-
tions conducted by these military commissions. The two peti-
tioners were convicted in unrelated cases of embezzlment and
assault, respectively. One of the petitioner's trial was con-
ducted over eight months after the Pearl Harbor attack, while
the other was tried over two years after that attack.2"'
Although the Duncan Court faced very similar issues as
those in Milligan, there was a significant distinction. In Milli-
gan, the President, without any express approval from Con-
gress, declared martial law.2" 4 In Duncan, Congress had passed
the Hawaiian Organic Act. This Act granted the Governor of
Hawaii the authority, in certain specified emergencies,2"5 to
declare martial law. This Act also granted the President the
authority to approve the governor's decision and thus continue
the state of martial law. Therefore, the Duncan Court had to
address an issue not present in Milligan: whether the Organic
Act had empowered the military "to supplant all civilian laws
and to substitute military for judicial trials."2 6 If the Act had
191. Id. at 107.
192. Id. at 109.
193. Id. at 127.
194. NEELY, supra note 122, at 176.




199. Id. at 124-25.
200. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
201. Id. at 307.
202. Id. at 308.
203. Id. at 310.
204. NEELY, supra note 122, 65, 68.
205. Id. at 308. The governor was authorized to declare martial law in Hawaii when it was necessary "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection,
or rebellion in the said Territory." Id.
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not so empowered the military, then the Court could rely on
Milligan to resolve the granted issue.
In addressing this issue, the Court pointed out that the term
martial law was open to a variety of definitions. Because the
Organic Act was unclear on its face, and the Act's legislative
history was inadequate, the Court stated, "[I]t must look to
other sources in order to interpret that term."2 7 The other
sources the Court considered were those embodied "in the
birth, development and growth of our governmental institu-
tions."2 ' Based on these other sources the Court concluded
Congress "did not wish to exceed the boundaries between mil-
itary and civilian power."2 9 Congress intended instead "to
authorize the military to act vigorously for the maintenance of
an orderly civil government and for the defense of the Islands
against actual or threatened rebellion or invasion [and] was not
intended to authorize the supplanting of courts by military tri-
bunals."2 0
After determining that Congress did not intend to authorize
military trials to supplant civilian criminal trials, the Court
stated simply: "[W]e hold that both petitioners are now enti-
tled to be released from custody."2"' The majority did not do an
additional "Milligan" analysis to determine whether martial
law was permissible under an argument of necessity. This lack
of an examination, however, does not suggest that the standards
created in Milligan no longer exist. In the Court's statement of
the facts at the beginning of the Duncan opinion, the Court
noted that at the time of both petitioners' convictions the civil-
ian courts were open in some capacity. Additionally, the Court
indicated that "at the time the alleged offenses were committed
the dangers apprehended by the military were not sufficiently
imminent to cause them to require civilian evacuation or even
to evacuate the buildings necessary to carry on the business of
the courts." '212 Thus, it was unnecessary for the Court to discuss
the Milligan "open court" test. The Court had already con-
cluded in the accepted facts of the case that the Hawaiian courts
were capable of being in operation at the time the petitioners
were tried by military commission.
Milligan and Duncan stand for the proposition that martial
law courts will not be permitted to supplant the jurisdiction of
U. S. civilian courts where those civilian courts are capable of
operation. Both Milligan and Duncan point out that the roots
of this rule run as deeply as those of the Constitution. These
decisions also stand for the proposition that even in the extreme
circumstances of war, the subordination of the military to civil-
ian control must, to the greatest extent possible, continue.
Military Government Court
As discussed above, the constitutional restrictions on mili-
tary commissions are at their zenith when the military seeks to
subject U.S. civilians to the jurisdiction of martial law courts
within the United States. These constitutional restrictions are
at their lowest ebb, however when U.S. civilians or others are
subjected to these same courts outside of the United States. As
early as 1853, in Cross v. Harrison,21 3 the Supreme Court
announced its acceptance of the principle that military govern-
ments in occupied territories had the right to govern the popu-
lation of that territory in accordance with "the lawful exercise
of a belligerent right over a conquered territory." '214 The Court
reiterated this proposition in 1879 in the case of Dow v.
Johnson,2 15 when the Court once again upheld the lawfulness of
a military government court in an area outside of the United
States.216
In Duncan v. Kahanamoku,21 7 the Court made it clear that
one of the authorities given to the military government in an
occupied territory is the power to try civilians. The Court dis-
tinguished military government courts operating in occupied
territories from that of martial law courts operating in the
United States, stating: "[W]e are not concerned with the recog-
206. Id. at 313.
207. Id. at 319.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 324.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 324.
212. Id. at 313.
213. 57 (16 How.) 164 (1853).
214. Id. at 192.
215. 100 U.S. 158 (1879).
216. Id. at 166.
217. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
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nized power of the military to try civilians in tribunals estab-
lished as a part of a temporary military government over
occupied enemy territory or territory regained from an enemy
where civilian government cannot or does not function."2"
The most recent case on this point is Madsen v. Kinsella.2"9
In Madsen, the petitioner was a U.S. civilian convicted of mur-
der by a military government court in occupied Germany.220
The petitioner claimed she had the right to trial by courts-mar-
tial rather than military commission. The Court disagreed. In
reaching its conclusion that military commissions in Germany
had jurisdiction to try U.S. civilians, the Court stated: "Since
our nation's earliest days, such commissions have been consti-
tutionally recognized agencies for meeting many urgent gov-
ernmental responsibilities related to war.""22  One of these
responsibilities is "the President['s] ... urgent and infinite
responsibility ... of governing any territory occupied by the
United States by force of arms." '222
Law of War Court
The final circumstance to be discussed regarding the juris-
diction of military commissions is the use of a law of war court
to try a U.S. civilian. This particular jurisdictional circum-
stance is thorny and not fully developed. The boundaries of
military commission jurisdiction in this context appears to
straddle the line between jurisdiction over military personnel,
when jurisdiction is not in doubt, and jurisdiction over U.S.
civilians violating laws heard by civilian courts, when jurisdic-
tion is reluctant.
The Supreme Court addressed this issue, at least in part, in
Exparte Quirin.223 In Quirin, the Court qualified the broad lan-
guage of Milligan, concluding that although military commis-
sions in the United States cannot try U.S. civilians, they can try
U.S. citizens who engage in belligerent acts.224
One of the petitioners in Quirin, Haupt, claimed U.S. citi-
zenship.225 Based on this claim, Haupt asserted that Milligan
prohibited his trial before a military commission so long as the
civilian courts were open.226 The government opposed Haupt's
claim, arguing that through his conduct he had effectively
renounced his U.S. citizenship. The Court concluded it did not
have to resolve the issue of Haupt's citizenship "because citi-
zenship of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the
consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in
violation of the law of war." '22 The Court went on to state:
"Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the
enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction
enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents
within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of
war."22 Thus, according to Quirin, a U.S. citizen who is an
unlawful belligerent exposed himself to the potential penalties
associated with that violation of the law of war,22 9 including
trial by military commission.
These statements represent at least a partial departure from
the holding in Milligan that military commissions "can never be
applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of
the government, and where the courts are open and their pro-
cess unobstructed.""2 3 Recognizing this departure, the Quirin
court distinguished Milligan by emphasizing that, unlike the
petitioners in Quirin,' the petitioner in Milligan was not "a
218. Id. at 314.
219. 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
220. Id. at 343.
221. Id. at 346.
222. Id. at 348.
223. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
224. Id. at 37-38.
225. Id. at 20.
226. Id. at 45.
227. Id. at 37.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 37-38.
230. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121(1866).
231. Id. The petitioners in Quirin were charged with "being enemies who, with the purpose of destroying war materials and utilities, entered, or after entry remained
in, our territory without uniform an offense against the law of war." Id. The distinction between the petitioner's status in Milligan versus Quirin was emphasized
by Mr. Patrick Philbin during a panel discussion hosted by the American Bar Association in Washington, D.C., on 16 January 2002.
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part of or associated with the armed forces of the enemy ' and
thus "was a non-belligerent, not subject to the laws of war.
233
The Quirin Court ruled that Milligan was not intended to
address the situation present in Quirin.
234
Although the Court supported the use of military commis-
sions to try the petitioners in Quirin, it refused to provide a
comprehensive definition of when U.S. military commissions
sitting in the United States may try its citizens for violations of
the laws of war. Instead, the Court concluded it "had no occa-
sion to define with meticulous care the ultimate boundaries of
the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try persons according to
the law of war ... [because] it is enough that petitioners here,
upon the conceded facts, were plainly within those bound-
a rie s .
'23
1
The issues at stake when the military takes over the tradi-
tional functions of a civilian government within the United
States are substantial. According to the Court in Milligan, their
significance "cannot be overstated; for it involves the very
framework of the government and the fundamental principles
of American liberty. '236 In Milligan and Duncan the Court
established standards to protect those principles and to ensure
that martial law courts are used only in the most extreme cir-
cumstances. The fundamental principles at issue in Milligan
and Duncan are not as present in cases where military commis-
sions are operating in occupied territories or as war courts. Mil-
itary government courts do not raise the same specter of
military domination of civilian government as those same
courts operating within the United States. Additionally, mili-
tary commissions in the form of war courts do not present the
same concerns as martial law courts operating in the United
States. War courts do not seek to subject the entire civilian pop-
ulace of a given area to trials by military court.
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Nationals
The jurisdictional basis to try foreign nationals by military
commission is, in general, the same as that for trying U.S. citi-
zens. The United States can exercise military commission
jurisdiction over foreign nationals through martial law courts,
military government courts, or war courts. Foreign nationals
can be tried for violations of the laws of war or for violations of
crimes normally heard by civilian courts when in an area under
U.S. military government. Despite the same general jurisdic-
tional authority to try foreign nationals by military commission
as that to try U.S. citizens, there are jurisdictional wrinkles.
These wrinkles include the application of international treaties
that would not be in issue for the trial of U.S. citizens, and
issues related to habeas corpus jurisdiction. In re Yamashita2"7
and Johnson v. Eisentrager2 38 address these issues.
In re Yamashita involved the prosecution of General
Tomoyuki Yamashita for violations of the laws of war. The
charges against General Yamashita alleged, in part, that
while commander of armed forces of Japan at
war with the United States of America and its
allies, [he] unlawfully disregarded and failed
to discharge his duty as commander to con-
trol the operations of the member of his com-
mand, permitting them to commit brutal
atrocities and other high crimes against peo-
ple of the United States and of its allies and
dependencies, particularly the Philippines.239
The prosecution submitted a bill of particulars listing 123 war
crimes committed by General Yamashita's troops while under
his command.24
Among General Yamashita's allegations of error was the
claim that the military commission that tried him violated Arti-
cles 60 and 63 of the 1929 Geneva Convention.24 Article 60 of
the 1929 Geneva Convention required a detaining power that is
about to direct "judicial proceedings ... against a prisoner of
war [to] . . . advise the representative of the protecting power
thereof as soon as possible, and always before the date set for
the opening of the trial. 24 2 Article 63 requires that a "sentence
may be pronounced against a prisoner of war only by the same
232. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,45 (1945).
233. Id. at 46.
234. Id. at 45.
235. Id. at 45-46.
236. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 118 (1866).
237. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
238. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
239. Id. at 13-14.
240. Id. at 14.
241. Id. at 20-21.
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courts and according to the same procedure as in the case of
persons belonging to the armed forces of the detaining
power. ' 243 The military commission that tried General Yamash-
ita did not notify his country, nor did the commission apply the
same rules of evidence and procedure as applied at courts-mar-
tial.
The Court examined both allegations of error, and found no
violation of the Convention. The Court held that Articles 60
and 63 were not intended to apply to violations of the laws of
war that occurred before an individual became a prisoner of
war.244 According to the Supreme Court, Articles 60 and 63
were intended to "apply only to judicial proceedings directed
against a prisoner of war for offenses committed while a pris-
oner of war.
245
Although the ultimate conclusion of the Supreme Court in
Yamashita regarding Article 63 is likely moot based on Article
85 of the 1949 Geneva Convention, the Court's application of
international law is significant. In the case of foreign nationals,
international treaties, such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
may restrict the jurisdiction of U.S. military commissions or
dictate certain minimum due process rights for those proceed-
ings. This could lead to the counter-intuitive situation where a
U.S. citizen being tried for a war crime would be entitled to less
due process than a foreign national tried for the same offenses.
In addition to the jurisdictional wrinkles created by interna-
tional treaties when trying foreign nationals by military com-
mission, there are habeas corpus issues as well. The habeas
corpus issues present are not relevant to the military commis-
sion's jurisdiction; instead they go to the jurisdiction of U.S.
federal courts. Johnson v. Eisentrager246 discussed these issues
at length.
The petitioners in Eisentrager were German nationals con-
victed of war crimes by an U.S. military commission conducted
in China.2 47 After being convicted, the petitioners were sent to
serve their respective sentences in a U.S. Army confinement
facility in occupied Germany. The petitioners sought a writ of
habeas corpus in the federal district court in Washington D.C.
The D.C. court ruled it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case
because the petitioners were confined outside of the United
States. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed,
concluding that jurisdiction existed to hear a writ of habeas cor-
pus where anyone was deprived of liberty based on the author-
ity of the United States.2 41 The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling
that under the circumstances, "no right to the writ of habeas cor-
pus appear[ed].
'2 49
The Court was cautious to limit its ruling that the petitioners
in Eisentrager did not have the right to the writ of habeas cor-
pus. The Court began by noting that the ruling in the case did
not apply to citizens, stating: "[W]ith the citizen we are now lit-
tle concerned, except to set his case as untouched by this deci-
sion and to take measure of the difference between his status
and that of all categories of aliens."25 Next, the Court indicated
that resident enemy aliens would still have access to the writ, as
the petitioners in Quirin and Yamashita did.25 This access was
based on territorial jurisdiction.252 The U. S. military confined
the petitioners in Quirin and Yamashita in the United States or
its territories, for crimes committed in the United States or its
territories.2 ' The Court's ruling, therefore, is directed at one
very specific class of people, "the nonresident enemy alien ...
who has remained in the service of the enemy. "254
The Court denied the petitioners access to the writ of habeas
corpus in Eisentrager because none of the traditional heads of
jurisdiction were present. The petitioners were nonresident
enemy aliens, whose crimes, trial, and confinement all occurred
242. Geneva Convention Relative to the Prisoners of War, art. 60, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2051, 118 L.N.T.S. 343.
243. Id. art. 63.
244. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1946).
245. Id.
246. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
247. Id. at 765-66. The petitioners were convicted of passing information to the Japanese after Germany had surrendered. Id.
248. Id. at 767.
249. Id. at 781.
250. Id. at 769.
251. Id. at 779-80.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 780.
254. Id. at 767.
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outside of the United States or its territories.25 The Court
expressed concern that granting nonresident enemy aliens in
active hostility with the United States access to the writ might
adversely affect future U.S. war efforts. The majority argued,
"[I]t would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a
field commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered
to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own civil
courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military
offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home."2 6
Eisentrager and Yamashita highlight some of the potential
jurisdictional wrinkles when the United States seeks to try for-
eign nationals at U.S. military commissions. These wrinkles
seem to counter-balance one another. On the one hand, based
on international treaties, foreign nationals may have rights
regarding military commissions that U.S. citizens do not. On
the other hand, U.S. citizens will always have access to our fed-
eral courts through the writ of habeas corpus, while foreign
nationals may not. Despite these wrinkles, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly supported the jurisdiction of military commis-
sions to try foreign nationals, both under customary interna-
tional law and the Constitution.
The jurisdiction for courts-martial and military commissions
are as varied and distinct as the constitutional authority for
these two courts. Each court's jurisdiction is restricted differ-
ently. These jurisdictional boundaries are affected by the loca-
tion and nature of the crime, the location of the court that tries
the offenders, the status of the offenders at the time they com-
mitted their offense and at the time of trial, and whether peace
has been declared. Yet, despite these variations, courts-martial
and military commissions share jurisdiction over violations of
the laws of war. This shared jurisdiction can be misleading and
give some the impression that courts-martial and military com-
missions are more alike than they are. A close examination of
the jurisdiction of the two courts highlights their different
natures.
Conclusion
Military commissions and courts-martial are both valid trial
venues, but they serve different purposes. Courts-martial are a
part of military law and are intended "to promote justice, to
assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed
forces, [and] to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the mil-
itary establishment."2" Military commissions are "an impor-
tant incident to the conduct of war" whereby a military
commander can "subject to disciplinary measures those ene-
mies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military
effort have violated the law of war."2" Military commissions
also serve as a valuable part of military government where, as a
result of war, no other government exists. These different pur-
poses are reflected in their different constitutional bases and
jurisdictional boundaries.
255. Id. at 767-68,781.
256. Id. at 769.
257. MCM, supra note 86, pt. 1, § 3.
258. Exparte Quirn, 317 U.S. 1,28 (1942); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 11(1946).
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